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Abstract
Anonymous Hierarchical Identity-Based Encryption (HIBE) is an extension of Identity-Based En-
cryption (IBE), and it provides not only a message hiding property but also an identity hiding property.
Anonymous HIBE schemes can be applicable to anonymous communication systems and public key
encryption systems with keyword searching. However, previous anonymous HIBE schemes have some
disadvantages that the security was proven in the weaker model, the size of ciphertexts is not short, or
the construction was based on composite order bilinear groups. In this paper, we propose the first effi-
cient anonymous HIBE scheme with short ciphertexts in prime order (asymmetric) bilinear groups, and
prove its security in the full model with an efficient reduction. To achieve this, we use the dual system
encryption methodology of Waters. We also present the benchmark results of our scheme by measuring
the performance of our implementation.
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1 Introduction
Hierarchical Identity-Based Encryption (HIBE) is an extension of Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) that
uses an identity as a public key. In HIBE, a user’s identity is represented as a hierarchical tree structure
and an upper level user can delegate the private key generation capability to a lower level user. Horwitz
and Lynn introduced the concept of HIBE to reduce the burden of the private-key generator of IBE [27].
After the introduction of HIBE, it was shown that HIBE can have various applications like identity-based
signature [25], public-key broadcast encryption [20], forward-secure public key encryption [14], and chosen-
ciphertext secure HIBE [15].
Recently, as a result of the increasing concern with users’ privacy, the need for cryptographic systems
that protect users’ privacy also increases. Anonymous HIBE can provide users’ privacy by supporting not
only the message hiding property but also the identity hiding property that hides identity information in
ciphertexts. Abdalla et al. formalized the concept of anonymous HIBE [1]. After that, Boyen and Waters
proposed the first secure anonymous HIBE scheme without random oracles [13]. The main applications
of anonymous HIBE are anonymous communication systems that provide anonymity between a received
message and a true sender and public key encryption systems with keyword searching that enable keyword
searches on encrypted data [8].
The security model of anonymous HIBE is defined as a game between a challenger and an adversary.
In this game, the adversary adaptively requests private keys in the private key query step and selects two
hierarchical identities ID0, ID1 and two messages M0,M1 in the challenge step. Next, the adversary is given
a challenge ciphertext of IDγ ,Mγ where γ is a random bit chosen by the challenger. The adversary wins the
game if he can correctly guess γ . The security model is divided as a selective model where the adversary
should commit the target hierarchical identities in the initial step and a full model where the adversary can
select the target hierarchical identities in the challenge step. Generally a selectively secure HIBE scheme is
converted to a fully secure HIBE scheme, but the reduction is inefficient [5]. The efficiency of the reduction
is important not only for theoretical reasons but also for practical reasons.
Let AdvA be the advantage of an adversary A that breaks a scheme and AdvB be the advantage of an
algorithm B that breaks an assumption using the adversary A. Suppose that AdvA ≤ L ·AdvB where L
is a reduction loss. Let λ ,k be the security level of the scheme and the assumption, respectively. If the
assumption provides the k-bit security, then it guarantees that AdvB ≤ 1/2k for any PPT algorithm B. Then
we can derive AdvA ≤ L ·1/2k from two inequalities AdvA ≤ L ·AdvB and AdvB ≤ 1/2k. To construct the
scheme that provides the λ -bit security, it should be guaranteed that AdvA ≤ 1/2λ for any PPT adversary
A. It is easy to achieve this by setting L ·1/2k ≤ 1/2λ since AdvA ≤ L ·1/2k. Thus we can derive a relation
k ≥ λ + log2(L). This relation says that the bit size k of a group order for the assumption should be larger
than λ + log2(L) to construct the scheme with the λ -bit security. For example, if there is a selectively secure
scheme with a hierarchical depth l = 10, then we should select k = 880 since λ = 80 and L = 2λ l . Therefore,
an ideal anonymous HIBE scheme should be fully secure with a reduction loss less than c ·q for a polynomial
value q and a constant c.
To construct a fully secure HIBE scheme with an efficient reduction, the new proof methodology named
the dual system encryption method was proposed by Waters [45]. In the dual system encryption method,
ciphertexts and private keys can be a normal type or a semi-functional type, and the semi-functional types
of ciphertexts and private keys are only used in security proofs. Additionally, the normal type and the
semi-functional type are indistinguishable, and the semi-functional ciphertexts are not decrypted by using
the semi-functional private keys. The proof of the dual system encryption method consists of hybrid games
that change a normal ciphertext and normal private keys to a semi-functional ciphertext and semi-functional
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private keys. Using this methodology, Waters proposed a fully secure HIBE scheme with linear-size cipher-
texts and a fully secure HIBE scheme with constant-size ciphertexts [33, 45]. The dual system encryption
method can be used to prove the security of fully secure attribute-based encryption [31], fully secure predi-
cate encryption [37], and leakage-resilient cryptography [32].
The first secure anonymous HIBE scheme was proposed by Boyen and Waters [13], and it was proven
to be selectively secure without random oracles. After the first construction of anonymous HIBE, several
anonymous HIBE schemes were presented, but they were only proved to be secure in the selective model
[21,29,41]. Recently, De Caro et al. proposed a fully secure anonymous HIBE scheme with short ciphertexts
by using the dual system encryption method [16]. However, their scheme is inefficient since the scheme is
based on composite order groups where the group order is a product of four prime numbers. One may
use the conversion method of Freeman [22] to construct a scheme in prime order groups from a scheme in
composite order groups, but this method can not be applied to the dual system encryption method of Lewko
and Waters [33] since it does not provide the parameter hiding property in composite order groups1. Lewko
recently devised another conversion method for the dual system encryption method and constructed a (non-
anonymous) unbounded HIBE scheme with linear-size ciphertexts in prime order groups [30]. However, this
method is not known to be applicable for the construction of an anonymous HIBE scheme with constant-size
ciphertexts since it uses dual pairing vector spaces (DPVS)2.
Anonymous HIBE can also be constructed from Predicate Encryption (PE) with the delegation ca-
pability. Shi and Waters constructed an anonymous HIBE scheme with linear-size ciphertexts from a
delegatable Hidden Vector Encryption (dHVE) scheme [42] and Okamoto and Takashima constructed an
anonymous HIBE scheme with linear-size ciphertexts from a Hierarchical Inner Product Encryption (HIPE)
scheme [31, 36, 37, 39]. However, currently known anonymous HIBE schemes from PE schemes with the
delegation capability only have linear-size ciphertexts. It is also possible to derive anonymous HIBE from
anonymous Spatial Encryption (SE) [11, 19]. However, there is no known anonymous SE scheme with
constant-size ciphertexts. Thus the construction of efficient and fully secure anonymous HIBE with short
ciphertexts is an unsolved problem.
1.1 Our Contributions
Motivated by the above challenge, we propose the first fully secure and anonymous HIBE scheme with short
ciphertexts in prime order (asymmetric) bilinear groups. The comparison between previous HIBE schemes
and ours is given in Table 1. To construct a fully secure and anonymous HIBE scheme, we use the IBE
scheme in prime order (asymmetric) bilinear groups of Lewko and Waters [33]. Note that their IBE scheme
does not even converted to a (non-anonymous) HIBE scheme with short ciphertexts since it does not support
private key re-randomization3 .
To construct an anonymous HIBE scheme, we should devise techniques for private key re-randomization
and ciphertext anonymization. The private key re-randomization process is required in the delegation algo-
1Lewko and Waters used the parameter hiding property of composite order groups to prove the full security of their HIBE
scheme using the dual system encryption technique [33]. The parameter hiding property of composite order N = pqr is stated that
an exponent ZN has one-to-one correspondence with (Zp,Zq,Zr) because of Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) and Zq and Zr
values are information theoretically hidden to an adversary even if Zp value is revealed to the adversary.
2The dimensions of DPVS is generally proportional to the size of an identity vector in the scheme that uses DPVS [30, 36, 39].
Thus an HIBE scheme based on DPVS that supports l-depth has linear-size of ciphertexts since it requires at least l-dimensions in
DPVS. To reduce the dimensions of DPVS, one may try to use the technique of Okamoto and Takashima [38], but it only applied
to non-anonymous schemes since it should reveal the identity of ciphertexts.
3To support private key re-randomization using a public key, some elements gˆ, uˆ, ˆh ∈ ˆG in a private key should be moved to a
public key. However, these elements cannot be moved to the public key since the proof of dual system encryption goes wrong.
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Table 1: Comparison between previous HIBE schemes and ours
Scheme ANON R.L. Prime PP Size SK Size CT Size Assumption
GS-HIBE [25] No Ω(ql) Yes O(λ ) O(lλ ) O(lλ ) BDH (ROM)
BB-HIBE [5] No Ω(2λ l) Yes O(lλ ) O(lλ ) O(lλ ) DBDH
BBG-HIBE [7] No Ω(2λ l) Yes O(lλ ) O(lλ ) 2k+ kT q-Type
CS-HIBE [18] No Ω(ql) Yes O(lλ ) O(lλ ) O(lλ ) DBDH
Waters-HIBE [45] No Ω(q2) Yes O(lλ ) O(lλ ) O(lλ ) DBDH, DLIN
LW-HIBE [33] No Ω(q) No O(lλ ) O(lλ ) 2k+ kT Static
LW-HIBE [34] No Ω(q) No O(λ ) O(lλ ) O(lλ ) Static
OT-HIPE [38] No Ω(q) Yes O(l4λ ) O(l2λ ) 133k+ kT DLIN
Lewko-HIBE [30] No Ω(q) Yes O(λ ) O(lλ ) O(lλ ) DLIN
BW-HIBE [13] Yes Ω(2λ l) Yes O(l2λ ) O(l2λ ) O(lλ ) DBDH, DLIN
SKOS-HIBE [41] Yes Ω(2λ l) No O(lλ ) O(lλ ) 3k+ kT q-Type
Ducas-HIBE [21] Yes Ω(2λ l) Yes O(lλ ) O(lλ ) 3k+ kT q-Type
LL-HIBE [29] Yes Ω(2λ l) Yes O(lλ ) O(lλ ) 6k+ kT q-Type
DIP-HIBE [16] Yes Ω(q) No O(lλ ) O(lλ ) 2k+ kT Static
LOSTW-HIPE [31] Yes Ω(lq) Yes O(l4λ ) O(l3λ ) O(l2λ ) q-Type
OT-HIPE [37] Yes Ω(l2q) Yes O(l3λ ) O(l4λ ) O(l2λ ) DLIN
OT-HIPE [39] Yes Ω(lq) Yes O(l2λ ) O(l2λ ) O(lλ ) DLIN
Ours Yes Ω(q) Yes O(lλ ) O(lλ ) 6k+ kT Static
ANON = anonymity, R.L. = reduction loss, Prime = prime order bilinear groups
λ = security parameter, l = hierarchical depth, q = polynomial value, k,kT = the bit size of group G and GT
rithm of HIBE and anonymous HIBE. In HIBE, private keys are simply re-randomized using the public
elements of public parameters. However, private keys of anonymous HIBE cannot be simply re-randomized
using the public elements because an attacker can break anonymity using the public elements. To solve this
problem, we may use the private re-randomization technique of Boyen and Waters [13] that re-randomizes
private keys using the private elements of private keys. Nevertheless, if the private re-randomization tech-
nique is used in the dual system encryption method, then additional random values in semi-functional pri-
vate keys are not completely randomized in the proof that distinguishes a normal private key from a semi-
functional private key.
To resolve this difficulty, we define two types of semi-functional private keys as semi-functional type-1
and semi-functional type-2, and we show that it is hard to distinguish these two types of semi-functional
private keys. The main idea to provide ciphertext anonymity is that the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH)
assumption still holds in asymmetric bilinear groups of prime order. We prove the anonymity property of our
scheme by introducing a new assumption since the simple DDH assumption is not enough for the security
proof. Furthermore, we implemented our anonymous HIBE scheme using the PBC library to support our
claim of efficiency and we measured the performance of our scheme.
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1.2 Related Work
IBE was introduced to solve the certificate management problem in public key encryption systems, but it
additionally requires a Private-Key Generator (PKG) [9, 10]. HIBE was invented to reduce the burden of
the IBE’s PKG by re-arranging an identity as a hierarchical tree structure and by allowing the delegation of
private key generation from upper level users to lower level users [27]. Gentry and Silverberg proposed the
first HIBE scheme in the random oracle model [25]. Canetti et al. constructed the first HIBE scheme without
random oracles and introduced a selective model to prove the security of their scheme [14]. The selective
model was widely used in the security proof of IBE and HIBE even though it is weaker than the full model.
For instance, Boneh and Boyen proposed an efficient HIBE scheme with linear-size ciphertexts [5, 6], and
Boneh et al. proposed an HIBE scheme with constant-size ciphertexts [7].
To construct a fully secure HIBE scheme, Boneh and Boyen showed that a selectively secure HIBE
scheme is naturally converted to a fully secure HIBE scheme with exponential loss of a reduction efficiency
[5]. However, this approach has a serious problem – that is, the efficiency of the reduction is 1/Ω(2λ l)
where λ is a security parameter and l is the maximum hierarchical depth. To remedy this situation, Waters
proposed an HIBE scheme by extending his fully secure IBE scheme with an efficient reduction to a HIBE
scheme [44], and Chatterjee and Sarkar improved the efficiency of Waters’ scheme [18]. However, these
schemes also have the problem of an inefficient reduction 1/Ω(ql) in the hierarchical setting where q is a
polynomial value. Gentry and Halevi proposed another fully secure HIBE scheme with an efficient reduction
by using complex assumptions [24]. Recently, Waters introduced the dual system encryption method that
can be used to construct a fully secure HIBE scheme with an efficient reduction under simple assumptions
[33, 45].
Anonymous IBE is related to public key encryption with keyword search (PEKS) [8, 23], and the con-
cept of anonymous HIBE was introduced by Abdalla et al. [1] by extending the concept of anonymous IBE.
Boyen and Waters proposed the first anonymous HIBE scheme without random oracles and proved its se-
curity in the selective model [13]. For the construction of anonymous HIBE, they devised a linear splitting
technique for ciphertext anonymity and a private re-randomization technique for private key randomization.
Seo et al. proposed the first anonymous HIBE scheme with short ciphertexts in composite order bilinear
groups [41]. Ducas constructed anonymous HIBE schemes using asymmetric bilinear groups of prime or-
der [21]. Lee and Lee proposed an efficient anonymous HIBE scheme with short ciphertexts that is secure in
all types of bilinear groups of prime order [29]. De Caro et al. proposed the first fully secure and anonymous
HIBE scheme with short ciphertexts using the dual system encryption method in composite order bilinear
groups [16].
HIBE schemes also can be constructed from Attribute Based Encryption (ABE) schemes [26] and
Predicate Encryption (PE) schemes with delegation capabilities [36, 42]. PE schemes with linear-size ci-
phertexts that have the delegation capability include the dHVE scheme of Shi and Waters in composite
order bilinear groups [42] and HIPE schemes of Okamoto and Takashima based on dual pairing vector
spaces [31, 36, 37, 39]. A non-anonymous HIPE scheme based on dual pairing vector spaces can have
constant-size ciphertexts, but the ciphertext should contain a linear-size identity vector [38]. Though bi-
linear groups were widely used in the construction of HIBE, some HIBE schemes were designed in lat-
tices [3, 4, 17].
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2 Preliminaries
We define anonymous HIBE and give the formal definition of its full model security. Let I be an identity
space and M be a message space. A hierarchical identity ID of depth c is defined as an identity vector
(I1, . . . , Ic) ∈ Ic. A hierarchical identity ID = (I1, . . . , Ic) of depth c is a prefix of a hierarchical identity
ID′ = (I′1, . . . , I′d) of depth d if c≤ d and for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,c}, Ii = I′i .
2.1 Anonymous HIBE
An anonymous HIBE scheme consists of five algorithms (Setup, KeyGen, Delegate, Encrypt, Decrypt).
Formally it is defined as:
Setup(1λ , l). The setup algorithm takes as input a security parameter 1λ and a maximum hierarchical depth
l. It outputs a master key MK and public parameters PP.
KeyGen(ID,MK,PP). The key generation algorithm takes as input a hierarchical identity ID of depth m
where m≤ l, the master key MK, and the public parameters PP. It outputs a private key SKID for ID.
Delegate(ID′,SKID,PP). The delegation algorithm takes as input a hierarchical identity ID′ of depth m+1
where m+1≤ l, a private key SKID for a hierarchical identity ID of depth m, and the public parameters
PP. If ID is a prefix of ID′, then it outputs a delegated private key SKID′ for ID′.
Encrypt(ID,M,PP). The encryption algorithm takes as input a hierarchical identity ID of depth n where
n≤ l, a message M ∈M, and the public parameters PP. It outputs a ciphertext CT for ID and M.
Decrypt(CT,SKID,PP). The decryption algorithm takes as input a ciphertext CT for a hierarchical identity
ID′, a private key SKID for a hierarchical identity ID, and the public parameters PP. If ID = ID′, then
it outputs an encrypted message M.
The correctness property of anonymous HIBE is defined as follows: For all MK,PP generated by Setup,
all ID, ID′ ∈ In, any SKID generated by KeyGen, and any M, it is required that
• If ID = ID′, then Decrypt(Encrypt(ID′,M,PP),SKID,PP) = M.
• If ID 6= ID′, then Decrypt(Encrypt(ID′,M,PP),SKID,PP) =⊥ with all but negligible probability.
The second condition of the correctness property is not a trivial one to satisfy since the decryption algorithm
of anonymous HIBE cannot easily check whether ID = ID′ or not because of anonymity. One possible re-
laxation is to use a computational condition instead of a statistical condition. For a computational condition,
we can use weak robustness of Abdalla et al. [2].
The security property of anonymous HIBE under a chosen plaintext attack is defined in terms of the
following experiment between a challenger C and a PPT adversary A:
1. Setup: C runs Setup(1λ , l) to generate a master key MK and public parameters PP. It keeps MK to
itself and gives PP to A.
2. Query 1: A may adaptively request a polynomial number of private keys for hierarchical identities
ID1, . . . , IDq1 of arbitrary depths. In response, C gives the corresponding private keys SKID1 , . . . ,SKIDq1
to A by running KeyGen(IDi,MK,PP).
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3. Challenge: A submits two hierarchical identities ID∗0, ID∗1 ∈ In and two messages M∗0 ,M∗1 with equal
length subject to the restriction: for all IDi of private key queries, IDi is not a prefix of ID∗0 and
ID∗1. C flips a random coin γ ∈ {0,1} and gives the challenge ciphertext CT ∗ to A by running
Encrypt(ID∗γ ,M∗γ ,PP).
4. Query 2: A may continue to request a polynomial number of private keys for hierarchical identities
IDq1+1, . . . , IDq subject to the restriction as before.
5. Guess: A outputs a guess γ ′ ∈ {0,1} of γ , and wins the game if γ ′ = γ .
The advantage of A is defined as AdvAHIBEA (λ ) =
∣∣Pr[γ = γ ′]−1/2∣∣ where the probability is taken over all
the randomness of the experiment. An anonymous HIBE scheme is fully secure under a chosen plaintext
attack if for all PPT adversary A, the advantage of A in the above experiment is negligible in the security
parameter λ .
The security experiment of anonymous HIBE can be relaxed to complete one introduced by Shi and
Waters [42] that traces the path of delegation. Our definition of the security experiment that does not trace
the path of delegation is stronger than the complete one of Shi and Waters. Thus if an anonymous HIBE
scheme is secure in the security experiment of this section, then the scheme is also secure in the complete
one.
2.2 Asymmetric Bilinear Groups
Let G, ˆG and GT be multiplicative cyclic groups of prime order p with the security parameter λ . Let g, gˆ be
generators of G, ˆG. The bilinear map e : G× ˆG→GT has the following properties:
1. Bilinearity: ∀u ∈G,∀vˆ ∈ ˆG and ∀a,b ∈ Zp, e(ua, vˆb) = e(u, vˆ)ab.
2. Non-degeneracy: ∃g, gˆ such that e(g, gˆ) has order p, that is, e(g, gˆ) is a generator of GT .
We say that G, ˆG,GT are bilinear groups with no efficiently computable isomorphisms if the group opera-
tions in G, ˆG, and GT as well as the bilinear map e are all efficiently computable, but there are no efficiently
computable isomorphisms between G and ˆG.
2.3 Complexity Assumptions
We introduce five assumptions under asymmetric bilinear groups of prime order. Assumptions 1 and 2
were introduced in Lewko and Waters [33], and Assumptions 3 and 4 are well-known. Assumption 5
(Asymmetric 3-Party Diffie-Hellman) is an asymmetric version of the Composite 3-Party Diffie-Hellman
assumption introduced by Boneh and Waters [12] with a slight modification by augmenting one additional
element, and it is secure in the generic group model.
Assumption 1 (LW1) Let (p,G, ˆG,GT ,e) be a description of the asymmetric bilinear group of prime order
p with the security parameter λ . Let g, gˆ be generators of G, ˆG respectively. The assumption is that if the
challenge values
D = ((p,G, ˆG,GT ,e),g,ga,gb,gab
2
,gb
2
,gb
3
,gc,gac,gbc,gb
2c,gb
3c, gˆ, gˆb) and T
are given, no PPT algorithm B can distinguish T = T0 = gab
2c from T = T1 = gd with more than a negligible
advantage. The advantage of B is defined as AdvA1B (λ ) =
∣∣Pr[B(D,T0) = 0]−Pr[B(D,T1) = 0]
∣∣ where the
probability is taken over the random choice of a,b,c,d ∈ Zp.
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Assumption 2 (LW2) Let (p,G, ˆG,GT ,e) be a description of the asymmetric bilinear group of prime order
p with the security parameter λ . Let g, gˆ be generators of G, ˆG respectively. The assumption is that if the
challenge values
D = ((p,G, ˆG,GT ,e),g,ga,ga
2
,gbx,gabx,ga
2x, gˆ, gˆa, gˆb, gˆc) and T
are given, no PPT algorithm B can distinguish T = T0 = gˆbc from T = T1 = gˆd with more than a negligible
advantage. The advantage of B is defined as AdvA2B (λ ) =
∣∣Pr[B(D,T0) = 0]−Pr[B(D,T1) = 0]
∣∣ where the
probability is taken over the random choice of a,b,c,x,d ∈ Zp.
Assumption 3 (Symmetric eXternal Diffie-Hellman) Let (p,G, ˆG,GT ,e) be a description of the asymmet-
ric bilinear group of prime order p with the security parameter λ . Let g, gˆ be generators of G, ˆG respectively.
The assumption is that if the challenge values
D = ((p,G, ˆG,GT ,e),g, gˆ, gˆa, gˆb) and T
are given, no PPT algorithm B can distinguish T = T0 = gˆab from T = T1 = gˆc with more than a negligible
advantage. The advantage of B is defined as AdvA3B (λ ) =
∣∣Pr[B(D,T0) = 0]−Pr[B(D,T1) = 0]
∣∣ where the
probability is taken over the random choice of a,b,c ∈ Zp.
Assumption 4 (Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman) Let (p,G, ˆG,GT ,e) be a description of the asymmetric
bilinear group of prime order p with the security parameter λ . Let g, gˆ be generators of G, ˆG respectively.
The assumption is that if the challenge values
D = ((p,G, ˆG,GT ,e), g,ga,gb,gc, gˆ, gˆa, gˆb, gˆc) and T
are given, no PPT algorithm B can distinguish T = T0 = e(g, gˆ)abc from T = T1 = e(g, gˆ)d with more than a
negligible advantage. The advantage of B is defined as AdvA4B (λ ) =
∣∣Pr[B(D,T0) = 0]−Pr[B(D,T1) = 0]
∣∣
where the probability is taken over the random choice of a,b,c,d ∈ Zp.
Assumption 5 (Asymmetric 3-Party Diffie-Hellman) Let (p,G, ˆG,GT ,e) be a description of the asymmet-
ric bilinear group of prime order p with the security parameter λ . Let g, gˆ be generators of G, ˆG respectively.
The assumption is that if the challenge values
D = ((p,G, ˆG,GT ,e), g,ga,gb,gc,gab,ga
2b, gˆ, gˆa, gˆb) and T
are given, no PPT algorithm B can distinguish T = T0 = gabc from T = T1 = gd with more than a negligible
advantage. The advantage of B is defined as AdvA5B (λ ) =
∣∣Pr[B(D,T0) = 0]−Pr[B(D,T1) = 0]
∣∣ where the
probability is taken over the random choice of a,b,c,d ∈ Zp.
3 Anonymous HIBE
We construct an anonymous HIBE scheme in prime order (asymmetric) bilinear groups and prove its full
model security under static assumptions.
3.1 Construction
Let I = Z∗p. Our anonymous HIBE scheme is described as follows:
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Setup(1λ , l): This algorithm first generates the asymmetric bilinear groups G, ˆG,GT of prime order p of
bit size Θ(λ ). It chooses random elements g ∈ G and gˆ ∈ ˆG. It also chooses random exponents
ν ,φ1,φ2 ∈ Zp and sets τ = φ1 + νφ2. Next, it selects random exponents yh,{yui}li=1,yw,α ∈ Zp and
sets h = gyh , ˆh = gˆyh ,{ui = gyui , uˆi = gˆyui}li=1, wˆ = gˆyw . It outputs a master key MK = (gˆ, gˆα , ˆh,{uˆi}li=1)
and public parameters as
PP =
(
g,gν ,g−τ , h,hν ,h−τ , {ui,uνi ,u−τi }
l
i=1, wˆ
φ1 , wˆφ2, wˆ, Ω = e(g, gˆ)α
)
.
KeyGen(ID,MK,PP): This algorithm takes as input a hierarchical identity ID = (I1, . . . , Im) ∈ Im and the
master key MK. It first selects random exponents r1,c1,c2,{c3,i}li=m+1 ∈Zp and creates the decryption
and delegation components of a private key as
K1,1 = gˆα(ˆh
m
∏
i=1
uˆ
Ii
i )
r1(wˆφ1)c1 , K1,2 = (wˆφ2)c1 , K1,3 = wˆc1 ,
K2,1 = gˆr1(wˆφ1)c2 , K2,2 = (wˆφ2)c2 , K2,3 = wˆc2 ,{
L3,i,1 = uˆr1i (wˆ
φ1)c3,i , L3,i,2 = (wˆφ2)c3,i , L3,i,3 = wˆc3,i
}l
i=m+1.
Next, it selects random exponents r2,c4,c5,{c6,i}li=m+1 ∈ Zp and creates the randomization compo-
nents of the private key as
R1,1 = (ˆh
m
∏
i=1
uˆ
Ii
i )
r2(wˆφ1)c4 , R1,2 = (wˆφ2)c4 , R1,3 = wˆc4 ,
R2,1 = gˆr2(wˆφ1)c5 , R2,2 = (wˆφ2)c5 , R2,3 = wˆc5 ,{
R3,i,1 = uˆr2i (wˆ
φ1)c6,i , R3,i,2 = (wˆφ2)c6,i , R3,i,3 = wˆc6,i
}l
i=m+1.
Finally, it outputs a private key as
SKID =
(
K1,1,K1,2,K1,3, K2,1,K2,2,K2,3, {L3,i,1,L3,i,2,L3,i,3}li=m+1,
R1,1,R1,2,R1,3, R2,1,R2,2,R2,3, {R3,i,1,R3,i,2,R3,i,3}li=m+1
)
.
Delegate(ID′,SKID,PP): This algorithm takes as input a hierarchical identity ID′ = (I1, . . . , Im+1) ∈ Im+1
and a private key SKID for a hierarchical identity ID = (I1, . . . , Im) ∈ Im where ID is a prefix of ID′.
Let (W1,W2,W3) = (wˆφ1 , wˆφ2, wˆ). It first selects random exponents γ1,δ1,δ2,{δ3,i}li=m+2 ∈ Zp and
creates the decryption and delegation components of a delegated private key as
(
K′1,k = K1,kL
Im+1
3,m+1,k · (R1,kR
Im+1
3,m+1,k)
γ1W δ1k
)
1≤k≤3,
(
K′2,k = K2,k ·R
γ1
2,kW
δ2
k
)
1≤k≤3,{(
L′3,i,k = L3,i,k ·R
γ1
3,i,kW
δ3,i
k
)
1≤k≤3
}l
i=m+2.
Next, it selects random exponents γ2,δ4,δ5,{δ6,i}li=m+2 ∈ Zp and creates the randomization compo-
nents of the delegated private key as
(
R′1,k = (R1,kR
Im+1
3,m+1,k)
γ2W δ4k
)
1≤k≤3,
(
R′2,k = R
γ2
2,kW
δ5
k
)
1≤k≤3,
{(
R′3,i,k = R
γ2
3,i,kW
δ6,i
k
)
1≤k≤3
}l
i=m+2.
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Finally, it outputs a delegated private key as
SKID′ =
(
K′1,1,K
′
1,2,K
′
1,3, K
′
2,1,K
′
2,2,K
′
2,3, {L
′
3,i,1,L
′
3,i,2,L
′
3,i,3}
l
i=m+2,
R′1,1,R
′
1,2,R
′
1,3, R
′
2,1,R
′
2,2,R
′
2,3, {R
′
3,i,1,R
′
3,i,2,R
′
3,i,3}
l
i=m+2
)
.
The distribution of the delegated private key is the same as the original private key since the random
values are defined as r′1 = r1 + r2γ1,r′2 = r2γ2 where r1,r2 are random exponents in the private key
SKID. Note that c1,c2,{c3,i},c4,c5,{c6,i} are perfectly re-randomized since wˆφ1, wˆφ2 , wˆ are publicly
known and δ1,δ2,{δ3,i},δ4,δ5,{δ6,i} are chosen randomly.
Encrypt(ID,M,PP): This algorithm takes as input a hierarchical identity ID = (I1, . . . , In) ∈ In, a message
M ∈ GT , and the public parameter PP. It selects a random exponent t ∈ Zp and outputs a ciphertext
as
CT =
(
C = ΩtM, C1,1 = gt , C1,2 = (gν)t , C1,3 = (g−τ)t ,
C2,1 = (h
n
∏
i=1
u
Ii
i )
t , C2,2 = (hν
n
∏
i=1
(uνi )
Ii)t , C2,3 = (h−τ
n
∏
i=1
(u−τi )
Ii)t
)
.
Decrypt(CT,SKID,PP): This algorithm takes as input a ciphertext CT and a private key SKID for a hierar-
chical identity ID = (I1, . . . , In). It outputs the encrypted message as
M ←C ·
3
∏
i=1
e(C1,i,K1,i)−1 ·
3
∏
i=1
e(C2,i,K2,i).
3.2 Correctness
The first condition of the correctness property can be easily checked by the following equation as
3
∏
i=1
e(C1,i,K1,i)−1 ·
3
∏
i=1
e(C2,i,K2,i) = e(gt , gˆα(ˆh
n
∏
i=1
uˆ
Ii
i )
r1)−1 · e((h
n
∏
i=1
u
Ii
i )
t , gˆr1) = e(g, gˆ)−αt
since the inner product of (1,ν ,−τ) and (φ1,φ2,1) are zero. The second condition of the correctness prop-
erty can be satisfied by using the technique of Boneh and Waters [12] that uses the limited message space.
If we use a computational condition instead of a statistical condition, then we can achieve weak robustness
by using the transformation of Abdalla et al. [2].
3.3 Security Analysis
Theorem 3.1. The above anonymous HIBE scheme is fully secure under a chosen plaintext attack if Assump-
tions 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 hold. That is, for any PPT adversary A, there exist PPT algorithms B1,B2,B3,B4, and
B5 such that
AdvAHIBEA (λ )≤ AdvA1B1(λ )+q
(
AdvA2B2(λ )+Adv
A3
B3(λ )
)
+AdvA4B4(λ )+Adv
A5
B5(λ ).
where q is the maximum number of private key queries of A.
10
Proof. To prove the security of our scheme, we use the dual system encryption technique of [33, 45]. We
first describe a semi-functional key generation algorithm and a semi-functional encryption algorithm. They
are not used in a real system, but they are used in the security proof. For semi-functionality, we set f =
gy f , ˆf = gˆy f where y f is a random exponent in Zp.
KeyGenSF-1. The semi-functional type-1 key generation algorithm first creates a normal private key using
the master key. Let (K′1,1, . . . ,{R′3,i,1, . . . ,R′3,i,3}li=m+1) be the normal private key of a hierarchical iden-
tity ID = (I1, . . . , Im) with random exponents r1,r2,c1,c2,{c3,i},c4,c5,{c6,i} ∈ Zp. It selects random
exponents sk,1,zk,1,{zk,2,i}li=m+1,sk,2 ∈ Zp and outputs a semi-functional type-1 private key as
K1,1 = K′1,1( ˆf−ν)sk,1zk,1 , K1,2 = K′1,2 ˆf sk,1zk,1 , K1,3 = K′1,3,
K2,1 = K′2,1( ˆf−ν)sk,1 , K2,2 = K′2,2 ˆf sk,1 , K2,3 = K′2,3,{
L3,i,1 = L′3,i,1( ˆf−ν)sk,1zk,2,i, L3,i,2 = L′3,i,2 ˆf sk,1zk,2,i , L3,i,3 = L′3,i,3
}l
i=m+1,
R1,1 = R′1,1( ˆf−ν)sk,2zk,1 , R1,2 = R′1,2 ˆf sk,2zk,1 , R1,3 = R′1,3,
R2,1 = R′2,1( ˆf−ν)sk,2 , R2,2 = R′2,2 ˆf sk,2 , R2,3 = R′2,3,{
R3,i,1 = R′3,i,1( ˆf−ν)sk,2zk,2,i, R3,i,2 = R′3,i,2 ˆf sk,2zk,2,i , R3,i,3 = R′3,i,3
}l
i=m+1.
Note that the randomization components should contain the semi-functional part since this semi-
functional part enables the correct simulation of the security proof for anonymity.
KeyGenSF-2. The semi-functional type-2 key generation algorithm first creates a normal private key using
the master key. Let (K′1,1, . . . ,{R′3,i,1, . . . ,R′3,i,3}li=m+1) be the normal private key of a hierarchical
identity ID = (I1, . . . , Im). It selects random exponents sk,1,zk,1,{zk,2,i}li=m+1,sk,2,zk,3,{zk,4,i}li=m+1 ∈
Zp and outputs a semi-functional type-2 private key the same as the semi-functional type-1 private
key except that the randomization components are generated as
R1,1 = R′1,1( ˆf−ν)sk,2zk,3 , R1,2 = R′1,2 ˆf sk,2zk,3 , R1,3 = R′1,3,
R2,1 = R′2,1( ˆf−ν)sk,2 , R2,2 = R′2,2 ˆf sk,2 , R2,3 = R′2,3,{
R3,i,1 = R′3,i,1( ˆf−ν)sk,2zk,4,i , R3,i,2 = R′3,i,2 ˆf sk,2zk,4,i, R3,i,3 = R′3,i,3
}l
i=m+1.
Note that new random exponents zk,3,{zk,4,i}li=1 are chosen to generate the randomization components
of the semi-functional type-2 private key, whereas the same exponents zk,1,{zk,2,i}li=1 of the decryption
and delegation components are used to generate the randomization components in the semi-functional
type-1 private key.
EncryptSF. The semi-functional encryption algorithm first creates a normal ciphertext using the public
parameters. Let (C′,C′1,1, . . . ,C′2,3) be the normal ciphertext. It selects random exponents sc,zc ∈ Zp
and outputs a semi-functional ciphertext as
C =C′, C1,1 =C′1,1, C1,2 =C′1,2 f sc , C1,3 =C′1,3( f−φ2)sc ,
C2,1 =C′2,1, C2,2 =C′2,2 f sczc , C2,3 =C′2,3( f−φ2)sczc .
If we decrypt a semi-functional ciphertext by using a semi-functional type-2 private key, then the decryp-
tion fails since an additional element e( f , ˆf )sc((sk,1zk,1+sk,2zk,3γ)−(sk,1+sk,2γ)zc) remains. Note that the decryption
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can be done after re-randomizing the private key using a random exponent γ . If (sk,1zk,1 + sk,2zk,3γ) =
(sk,1 + sk,2γ)zc, then the decryption algorithm succeeds. However, the probability of this is negligible since
sk,1,sk,2,zk,1,zk,3,zc,γ are randomly chosen. In case of the semi-functional type-1 private key, the addi-
tional random element can be restated as e( f , ˆf )(sk,1+sk,2γ)sc(zk,1−zc). If zk,1 = zc, then the decryption algorithm
succeeds. In this case, we say that the private key is nominally semi-functional type-1.
The security proof consists of a sequence of games. The first game will be the original security game
and the last one will be a game such that the adversary has no advantage. We define the games as follows:
Game G0. This game is the original security game. That is, the private keys and the challenge ciphertext
are normal.
Game G1. We first modify G0 into a new game G1. This game is almost identical to G0 except that the
challenge ciphertext is semi-functional.
Game G2. Next, we modify G1 into a game G2. In this game, the private keys are semi-functional type-2
and the challenge ciphertext is semi-functional. Suppose that an adversary makes at most q private
key queries. For the security proof, we define a sequence of games G1,0, . . . ,G′1,k,G1,k, . . . ,G1,q where
G1,0 = G1. In G′1,k and G1,k, a normal private key is given to the adversary for all j-th private key
queries such that j > k and a semi-functional type-2 private key is given to the adversary for all j-th
private key queries such that j < k. However, for k-th private key query, a semi-functional type-1
private key is given to the adversary in G′1,k where as a semi-functional type-2 private key is given in
G1,k. It is obvious that G1,q is equal to G2.
Game G3. We now define a new game. This game differs from G2 where the challenge ciphertext compo-
nent C is replaced by a random element in GT .
Game G4. Finally, we change G3 to a new game G4. In this game, the semi-functional ciphertext compo-
nents (C2,1,C2,2,C2,3) are formed as (Pt ,(Pν)t f sczc ,(P−τ)t( f−φ2)sczc) where P is a random element in
G. In this game, the challenge ciphertext gives no information about the random coin γ . Therefore,
the adversary can win this game with probability at most 1/2.
Let AdvG j
A
be the advantage of A in G j for j = 0, . . . ,4. Let AdvG1,kA and Adv
G′1,k
A
be the advantage of A in
G1,k and G′1,k for k = 0, . . . ,q. It is clear that AdvAHIBEA (λ ) = AdvG0A , Adv
G1,0
A
= AdvG1
A
, AdvG1,q
A
= AdvG2
A
,
and AdvG4
A
= 0. From the following five Lemmas, we obtain that it is hard to distinguish Gi−1 from Gi
under the given assumptions. Therefore, we have that
AdvAHIBEA (λ ) = AdvG0A +
3
∑
i=1
(
AdvGi
A
−AdvGi
A
)
−AdvG4
A
≤
4
∑
i=1
∣∣AdvGi−1
A
−AdvGi
A
∣∣
= AdvA1B1(λ )+
q
∑
k=1
(
AdvA2B2(λ )+Adv
A3
B3(λ )
)
+AdvA4B4(λ )+Adv
A5
B5
(λ ).
This completes our proof of Theorem 3.1.
Lemma 3.2. If Assumption 1 holds, then no PPT algorithm can distinguish between G0 and G1 with a
non-negligible advantage. That is, for any adversary A, there exists a PPT algorithm B1 such that
∣∣AdvG0
A
−
AdvG1
A
∣∣= AdvA1B1(λ ).
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Lemma 3.3. If Assumption 2 holds, then no PPT algorithm can distinguish between G1,k−1 and G′1,k with
a non-negligible advantage. That is, for any adversary A, there exists a PPT algorithm B2 such that∣∣AdvG1,k−1
A
−AdvG
′
1,k
A
∣∣= AdvA2B2(λ ).
Lemma 3.4. If Assumption 3 holds, then no PPT algorithm can distinguish between G′1,k and G1,k with a
non-negligible advantage. That is, for any adversary A, there exists a PPT algorithm B3 such that
∣∣AdvG
′
1,k
A
−
AdvG1,k
A
∣∣= AdvA3B3(λ ).
Lemma 3.5. If Assumption 4 holds, then no PPT algorithm can distinguish between G2 and G3 with a
non-negligible advantage. That is, for any adversary A, there exists a PPT algorithm B4 such that
∣∣AdvG2
A
−
AdvG3
A
∣∣= AdvA4B4(λ ).
Lemma 3.6. If Assumption 5 holds, then no PPT algorithm can distinguish between G3 and G4 with a
non-negligible advantage. That is, for any adversary A, there exists a PPT algorithm B5 such that
∣∣AdvG3
A
−
AdvG4
A
∣∣= AdvA5B5(λ ).
The security proof of Lemmas 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6 are given in Section 5.
3.4 Extensions
Relaxed Security Model. The original security experiment of anonymous HIBE requires that an adversary
should select two hierarchical identities ID∗0, ID∗1 ∈ In with equal depth n [1]. One possible relaxation of
the security experiment of anonymous HIBE is to allow the adversary to select two hierarchical identities
ID∗0 ∈ In1 , ID∗1 ∈ In2 with different depths n1,n2. Our scheme is also fully secure in this relaxed security
experiment since the ciphertext size is constant. The two challenge hierarchical identities with different
depths only matter in the security proof that distinguishes G3 from G4. In that proof, we showed that the
adversary cannot distinguish the challenge hierarchical identity ID∗γ from a random value. Thus our scheme
is secure in this relaxed experiment since the ciphertext size does not reveal the depth of the hierarchical
identity.
4 Performance Analysis
In this section, we analyze the running time of our scheme, and then we measure the performance of the
scheme by implementing it.
4.1 Runtime Analysis
To analyze the efficiency of our scheme, we use the abstract cost of expensive mathematical operations. In
bilinear groups, the expensive operations are exponentiation operations and pairing operations. Additionally,
the efficiency of exponentiations and pairings can be improved by doing m-term exponentiations and m-term
pairings respectively. The abstract cost of these operations is defined as follows:
• MPairCost(G, ˆG,m): m-term pairing ∏mi=1 e(gi, ˆhi) where gi ∈G,hi ∈ ˆG
• PairCost(G, ˆG): pairing e(g, ˆh) where g ∈G,h ∈ ˆG
• MExpCost(G,m): m-term exponentiation ∏mi=1 gaii where gi ∈G
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• ExpCost(G): exponentiation ga where g ∈G
Let l be the maximum number of hierarchical depth and d be the depth of ID. We define the abstract costs
of the setup algorithm, the key generation algorithm, the delegation algorithm, the encryption algorithm, and
the decryption algorithm as SetupCost,GenCost,DelCost,EncCost,DecCost respectively. The abstract
costs of these algorithm are obtained as follows:
SetupCost(l)≥ (2l +4)∗ExpCost(G)+2∗ExpCost( ˆG)+PairCost(G, ˆG),
GenCost(l,d)≥ (4(l−d)+4)∗ExpCost( ˆG)+ (2(l−d)+2)∗MExpCost( ˆG,2)
+
d
m
∗MExpCost( ˆG,m),
DelCost(l,d)≥ (6(l−d)+6)∗MExpCost( ˆG,2)+9∗ExpCost( ˆG),
EncCost(d)≥ 3d
m
∗MExpCost(G,m)+6∗ExpCost(G)+ExpCost(GT ),
DecCost≥ 2∗MPairCost(G, ˆG,3).
In asymmetric bilinear groups, the bit size of ˆG and the bit size of GT increase proportionally to the
embedding degree of asymmetric bilinear groups. Thus the cost of exponentiation in ˆG is higher than the
cost of exponentiation in G. In our scheme, the cost of the key generation algorithm and the cost of the
delegation algorithm are higher than the cost of other algorithm since our scheme uses group elements in
G for ciphertexts and group elements in ˆG for private keys, and these costs decrease proportionally to the
depth of ID. The cost of the encryption algorithm is small since it uses m-term exponentiations in G, and
the cost of the decryption algorithm is constant.
4.2 Implementation
To show the efficiency of our scheme, we present the implementation of our scheme and analyze the per-
formance of it. We use the Pairing Based Cryptography (PBC) library [35] to implement our scheme, and
we use a notebook computer with an Intel Core i5 2.53 GHz CPU as a test machine. We select a 175-bit
Miyaji-Nakabayashi-Takano (MNT) curve with embedding degree 6. In the 175-bit MNT curve, the group
size of G is about 175 bits, the group size of ˆG is about 525 bits, and the group size of GT is about 1050 bits.
The PBC library on the test machine can compute an exponentiation of G in 1.6 ms, an exponentiation of ˆG
in 20.3 ms, an exponentiation of GT in 4.7 ms, and a pairing in 15.6 ms. Additionally, the PBC library can
compute a three-term multi-exponentiation of G in 2.1 ms, a two-term multi-exponentiation of ˆG in 27.3 ms,
a three-term multi-exponentiation of ˆG in 28.6 ms, and a three-term multi-pairing in 31.2 ms. Therefore, we
can obtain the cost of our scheme using the 175-bit MNT curve on the test machine as follows:
GenCost(l,d)≥ 135.8∗ (l−d)+9.5∗d+135.8 ms,
DelCost(l,d)≥ 163.8∗ (l−d)+346.5 ms,
EncCost(d)≥ 2.1∗d +14.3 ms,
DecCost≥ 62.4 ms.
Let l = 30. The performance results of each algorithms are described in Figure 1. The setup algorithm
takes about 0.936 seconds to generate the public parameters and the master key. The key generation algo-
rithm and the delegation algorithm for one depth take about 4.259 seconds and 5.257 seconds respectively.
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Figure 1: Performance of our HIBE scheme
One method to improve the performance of the key generation algorithm is to preprocess the public param-
eters and the master key. If the preprocessing method is used, then the cost of the key generation algorithm
is reduced to 1/5. This method also can be used in the delegation algorithm.
5 Proof of Lemmas
In this section, we give the security proofs of Lemmas for our HIBE scheme.
5.1 Proof of Lemma 3.2 (Indistinguishability of G0 and G1)
In this proof, private keys are normal and the challenge ciphertext should be normal or semi-functional
depending on the T value of the given assumption. The main idea of this proof is that a simulator can only
create normal private keys since an element for semi-functional private keys is not given in the assumption
and the simulator embeds the T element of the assumption into the challenge ciphertext.
Simulator. Suppose there exists an adversary A that distinguishes between G0 and G1 with a non-
negligible advantage. A simulator B1 that breaks Assumption 1 using A is given: a challenge tuple
D = ((p,G, ˆG,GT ,e),k,ka,kb,kab
2
,kb2 ,kb3 ,kc,kac,kbc,kb2c,kb3c, ˆk, ˆkb) and T where T = T0 = kab
2c or T =
T1 = kab
2c+d
. Then B1 that interacts with A is described as follows: B1 first chooses random exponents
φ2,B,{Ai}li=1,α ∈ Zp and random blinding values yg,yh,{yui}li=1,yw ∈ Zp. It implicitly sets ν = a,φ1 =
b,τ = b+aφ2 and creates the public parameters as
g = kb2 kyg , gν = kab2(ka)yg , g−τ = (kb3(kb)yg(kab2)φ2(ka)ygφ2)−1,
h = (kb2)Bkyh , hν = (kab2)B(ka)yh , h−τ = ((kb3)B(kb)yh(kab2)Bφ2(ka)yhφ2)−1,
{
ui = (kb
2
)Aikyui , uνi = (kab
2
)Ai(ka)yui , u−τi = ((kb
3
)Ai(kb)yui (kab2)Aiφ2(ka)yui φ2)−1
}l
i=1,
wˆφ1 = (ˆkb)yw , wˆφ2 = ˆkywφ2, wˆ = ˆkyw , Ω = (e(kb3 , ˆkb) · e(kb2 , ˆk)2yg · e(k, ˆk)y2g)α .
It also implicitly sets gˆ = ˆkb2 ˆkyg , ˆh = ˆkb2B ˆkyh , uˆi = ˆkb
2Ai ˆkyui for the master key, but it cannot create these
elements since ˆkb2 is not given. Additionally, it sets f = k, ˆf = ˆk for the semi-functional ciphertext and
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private key. Let ∆(ID) = yh +∑mi=1 yuiIi and Γ(ID) = B+∑mi=1 AiIi where ID = (I1, . . . , Im). A adaptively
requests a private key for ID = (I1, . . . , Im). To response the private key query, B1 first selects random
exponents r1,c′1,c′2,{c′3,i}li=m+1 ∈ Zp. It implicitly sets c1 = −b(α +Γ(ID)r1)/yw + c′1, c2 = −br1/yw +
c′2, {c3,i = −bAir1/yw + c′3,i}li=m+1 and creates the decryption and delegation components of a private key
as
K1,1 = ˆkygα+∆(ID)r1(wˆφ1)c
′
1 , K1,2 = (K1,3)φ2 , K1,3 = (ˆkb)−(α+Γ(ID)r1)wˆc
′
1 ,
K2,1 = ˆkygr1(wˆφ1)c
′
2 , K2,2 = (K2,3)φ2 , K2,3 = (ˆkb)−r1wˆc
′
2 ,
{
L3,i,1 = ˆkyui r1(wˆφ1)c
′
3,i , L3,i,2 = (L3,i,3)φ2 , L3,i,3 = (ˆkb)−Air1wˆc
′
3,i
}l
i=m+1.
It also creates the randomization components of a private key similarly by selecting random exponents
r2,c
′
4,c
′
5,{c
′
6,i}
l
i=n+1 ∈ Zp except that R1,1 does not have gˆα . We omit the detailed description of these. In
the challenge step, A submits two challenge hierarchical identities ID∗0 = (I∗0,1, . . . , I∗0,n), ID∗1 = (I∗1,1, . . . , I∗1,n)
and two messages M∗0 ,M∗1 . B1 flips a random coin γ ∈ {0,1} internally. It implicitly sets t = c and creates a
challenge ciphertext as
C = (e(kb3c, ˆkb) · e(kb2c, ˆk)2yg · e(kc, ˆk)y2g)α ·M∗γ ,
C1,1 = kb
2c(kc)yg , C1,2 = T (kac)yg , C1,3 = ((kb
3c)(kbc)yg(T )φ2(kac)ygφ2)−1,
C2,1 = (kb
2c)Γ(ID
∗
γ )(kc)∆(ID∗γ ), C2,2 = (T )Γ(ID
∗
γ )(kac)∆(ID∗γ ),
C2,3 =
(
(kb3c)Γ(ID∗γ )(kbc)∆(ID∗γ )(T )φ2Γ(ID∗γ )(kac)φ2∆(ID∗γ )
)−1
.
Finally, A outputs a guess γ ′. If γ = γ ′, B1 outputs 0. Otherwise, it outputs 1.
Analysis. We first show that the distribution of the simulation using D,T = T0 = kab
2c is the same as G0.
The public parameters are correctly distributed since the random blinding values yg,yh,{yui},yw are used.
The private key is correctly distributed as
K1,1 = gˆα(ˆh
m
∏
i=1
uˆ
Ii
i )
r1(wˆφ1)c1 = (ˆkb2+yg)α(ˆkb2B+yh
m
∏
i=1
ˆk(b2Ai+yui )Ii)r1(ˆkbyw)−b(α+Γ(ID)r1)/yw+c′1
= ˆkygα+∆(ID)r1(wˆφ1)c′1 ,
K2,1 = gˆr1(wˆφ1)c2 = (ˆkb
2+yg)r1(ˆkbyw)−br1/yw+c′2 = ˆkygr1(wˆφ1)c′2 ,
L3,i,1 = uˆr1i (wˆ
φ1)c3,i = (ˆkb2Ai+yui )r1(ˆkbyw)−bAir1/yw+c′3,i = ˆkyui r1(wˆφ1)c′3,i .
Note that it can create a normal private key since c1,c2,{c3,i},c4,c5,{c6,i} enable the cancellation of ˆkb
2
,
but it cannot create a semi-functional private key since ˆka is not given. The challenge ciphertext is correctly
distributed as
C1,1 = gt = (kb
2+yg)c = kb2c(kc)yg , C1,2 = (gν)t = k(b
2+yg)ac = T0(kac)yg ,
C1,3 = (g−τ)t = (k(b
2+yg)(b+aφ2)c)−1 = ((kb3c)(kbc)yg(T0)φ2(kac)ygφ2)−1,
C2,1 = (h
n
∏
i=1
u
I∗γ,i
i )
t = (kb2B+yh
n
∏
i=1
k(b
2Ai+yui )I
∗
γ,i)c = (kb2c)Γ(ID∗γ )(kc)∆(ID∗γ ),
C2,2 = (hν
n
∏
i=1
(uνi )
I∗γ,i)t = (k(b2B+yh)a
n
∏
i=1
k(b
2Ai+yui )aI
∗
γ,i)c = (T0)Γ(ID
∗
γ )(kac)∆(ID∗γ ),
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C2,3 = (h−τ
n
∏
i=1
(u−τi )
I∗γ,i)t = ((k(b2B+yh)(b+aφ2)
n
∏
i=1
k(b
2Ai+yui )(b+aφ2)I∗γ,i)c)−1
= ((kb3c)Γ(ID∗γ )(kbc)∆(ID∗γ )(T0)φ2Γ(ID
∗
γ )(kac)φ2∆(ID∗γ ))−1.
We next show that the distribution of the simulation using D,T = T1 = kab
2c+d is the same as G1. We only
consider the distribution of the challenge ciphertext since T is only used in the challenge ciphertext. The
only difference between T0 and T1 is that T1 additionally has kd . Thus C1,2,C1,3,C2,2,C2,3 components that
have T in the simulation additionally have kd,(kd)−φ2,(kd)Γ(ID∗γ ),(kd)−φ2Γ(ID∗γ ) respectively. If we implicitly
set sc = d,zc = Γ(ID∗γ), then the challenge ciphertext is semi-functional. The distribution of this semi-
functional challenge ciphertext is the same as G1 since B,{Ai} for zc are information theoretically hidden
to A. We obtain Pr[B1(D,T0) = 0]− 1/2 = AdvG0A and Pr[B1(D,T1) = 0]− 1/2 = Adv
G1
A
from the above
analysis. Thus, we can easily derive the advantage of B1 as
AdvA1B1(λ ) =
∣∣Pr[B1(D,T0) = 0]−Pr[B1(D,T1) = 0]
∣∣= ∣∣AdvG0
A
−AdvG1
A
∣∣.
This completes our proof.
5.2 Proof of Lemma 3.3 (Indistinguishability of G1,k−1 and G′1,k)
In this proof, the challenge ciphertext is semi-functional and the k-th private key should be normal or semi-
functional type-1 depending on the T value of the given assumption. However, the paradox of dual system
encryption occurs in this proof since a simulator can create a semi-functional ciphertext to check the type
of the k-th private key by decrypting the semi-functional ciphertext using the k-the private key. The main
idea to solve this paradox is to use a nominally semi-functional type-1 private key. If the k-th private key is
nominally semi-functional type-1, then zk,1 of the nominally semi-functional private key is the same as the
zc of a semi-functional challenge ciphertext. Thus the simulator cannot distinguish the type of k-th private
key since the decryption of the semi-functional ciphertext using the k-th private key always succeeds.
Before proving this lemma, we introduce Assumption 2-A as follows: Let (p,G, ˆG,GT ,e) be a descrip-
tion of the asymmetric bilinear group of prime order p. Let g, gˆ be generators of G, ˆG respectively. As-
sumption 2-A is that if the challenge values D = ((p,G, ˆG,GT ,e),k,ka,ka
2
,kbx,kabx,ka2x, ˆk, ˆka, ˆkb, ˆky1 , ˆky2)
and T = (D1,D2) are given, no PPT algorithm can distinguish T = (ˆkby1 , ˆkby2) from T = (ˆkd1 , ˆkd2) with more
than a negligible advantage. It is easy to show that if there exists an adversary that breaks Assumption
2-A, then an algorithm can break Assumption 2 with the same probability by setting ˆky1 = (ˆkb)r1 ˆks1 , ˆky2 =
(ˆkb)r2 ˆks2 ,D1 = (T )r1(ˆkc)s1 ,D2 = (T )r1(ˆkc)s1 where ˆkb, ˆkc,T are given in Assumption 2 and r1,r2,s1,s2 are
random exponents in Zp. The simulated values are correctly distributed since there exists one-to-one corre-
spondence between {r1,s1,r2,s2} and {y1,y2,d1,d2}.
Simulator. Suppose there exists an adversary A that distinguishes between G1,k−1 and G′1,k with a
non-negligible advantage. A simulator B2 that breaks Assumption 2-A using A is given: a challenge tuple
D = ((p,G, ˆG,GT ,e),k,ka,ka
2
,kbx,kabx,ka2x, ˆk, ˆka, ˆkb, ˆky1 , ˆky2) and T = (D1,D2) where T = T0 = (D01,D02) =
(ˆkby1 , ˆkby2) or T = T1 = (D11,D12) = (ˆkby1+d1 , ˆkby2+d2). Then B2 that interacts with A is described as follows:
B2 first chooses random exponents ν ,yτ ,B,{Ai}li=1,α ∈Zp and random blinding values yh,{yui}li=1,yw ∈Zp.
It implicitly sets φ1 =−νb+(a+ yτ),φ2 = b,τ = a+ yτ and creates the public parameters as
g = ka, gν = (ka)ν , g−τ = (ka2(ka)yτ )−1,
h = (ka)Bkyh , hν = (ka)Bνkyhν , h−τ = ((ka2)B(ka)yh+Byτ kyhyτ )−1,
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{
ui = (ka)Aikyui , uνi = (ka)Aiνkyui ν , u−τi = ((ka
2
)Ai(ka)yui+Aiyτ kyui yτ )−1
}l
i=1,
wˆφ1 = ((ˆkb)−ν ˆka ˆkyτ )yw , wˆφ2 = (ˆkb)yw , wˆ = ˆkyw , Ω = e(ka, ˆka)α .
It also sets gˆ = ˆka, gˆα = (ˆka)α , ˆh = (ˆka)B ˆkyh ,{uˆi = (ˆka)Ai ˆkyui}li=1 for the master key. Additionally, it sets
f = k, ˆf = ˆk for the semi-functional ciphertext and private key. Let ∆(ID) = yh +∑mi=1 yuiIi and Γ(ID) =
B+∑mi=1 AiIi where ID = (I1, . . . , Im). A adaptively requests a private key for ID = (I1, . . . , Im). If this is a
j-th private key query, then B2 handles this query as follows:
• Case j < k : It creates a semi-functional private key by calling KeyGenSF-2 since it knows the master
key and the tuple ( ˆf−ν , ˆf ,1) for the semi-functional private key.
• Case j = k : It first selects random exponents r′1,c′1,c′2,{c′3,i}li=m+1 ∈ Zp. It implicitly sets r1 =−y1+
r′1, c1 = y1Γ(ID)/yw + c′1, c2 = y1/yw + c′2, {c3,i = y1Ai/yw + c′3,i}li=m+1 and creates the decryption
and delegation components of a private key as
K1,1 = gˆα(ˆky1)−∆(ID)(ˆh
m
∏
i=1
uˆIii )
r′1(D1)−νΓ(ID)(ˆky1)yτ Γ(ID)(wˆφ1)c
′
1 ,
K1,2 = (D1)Γ(ID)(wˆφ2)c
′
1 , K1,3 = (ˆky1)Γ(ID)wˆc
′
1 ,
K2,1 = gˆr
′
1(D1)−ν(ˆky1)yτ (wˆφ1)c
′
2 ,K2,2 = D1(wˆφ2)c
′
2 , K2,3 = ˆky1 wˆc
′
2 ,
{
L3,i,1 = (ˆky1)−yui uˆ
r′1
i (D1)
−νAi(ˆky1)yτ Ai(wˆφ1)c′3,i , L3,i,2 = (D1)Ai(wˆφ2)c
′
3,i ,
L3,i,3 = (ˆky1)Aiwˆc
′
3,i
}l
i=m+1.
It also creates the randomization components of a private key similarly by selecting random expo-
nents r′2,c
′
4,c
′
5,{c
′
6,i}
l
i=m+1 ∈ Zp except that it uses ˆky2 ,D2 instead of ˆky1 ,D1. We omit the detailed
description of these.
• Case j > k : It creates a normal private key by calling KeyGen since it knows the master key.
In the challenge step,A submits two challenge hierarchical identities ID∗0 =(I∗0,1, . . . , I∗0,n), ID∗1 =(I∗1,1, . . . , I∗1,n)
and two messages M∗0 ,M∗1 . B2 flips a random coin γ ∈ {0,1} internally and chooses a random exponent
t ′ ∈ Zp. It implicitly sets t = bx+ t ′, sc =−a2x, zc = Γ(ID∗γ) and creates a semi-functional ciphertext as
C = e(kabx, ˆka)α · e(ka, ˆka)αt ′ ·M∗γ ,
C1,1 = kabxgt
′
, C1,2 = (kabx)ν(gν)t
′
(ka2x)−1, C1,3 = (kabx)−yτ (g−τ)t
′
,
C2,1 = (kabx)Γ(ID
∗
γ )(kbx)∆(ID∗γ )(h
n
∏
i=1
u
I∗γ,i
i )
t ′ ,
C2,2 = (kabx)Γ(ID
∗
γ )ν(kbx)∆(ID∗γ )ν(hν
n
∏
i=1
(uνi )
I∗γ,i)t
′
(ka2x)−Γ(ID∗γ ),
C2,3 = (kabx)−Γ(ID
∗
γ )yτ (kabx)−∆(ID∗γ )(kbx)−∆(ID∗γ )yτ (h−τ
n
∏
i=1
(u−τi )
I∗γ,i)t
′
.
Finally, A outputs a guess γ ′. If γ = γ ′, B2 outputs 0. Otherwise, it outputs 1.
Analysis. We first show that the distribution of the simulation using D,T0 = (D01,D02) = (ˆkby1 , ˆkby2)
is the same as G1,k−1. The public parameters are correctly distributed since the random blinding values
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yh,{yui},yw are used. The k-th private key is correctly distributed as
K1,1 = gˆα(ˆh
m
∏
i=1
uˆ
Ii
i )
r1(wˆφ1)c1 = gˆα(ˆkaB+yh
m
∏
i=1
ˆk(aAi+yui )Ii)−y1+r′1(ˆkyw(−νb+a+yτ))y1Γ(ID)/yw+c′1
= gˆα(ˆky1)−∆(ID)(ˆh
m
∏
i=1
uˆ
Ii
i )
r′1(D01)
−νΓ(ID)(ˆky1)yτ Γ(ID)(wˆφ1)c′1 ,
K2,1 = gˆr1(wˆφ1)c2 = (ˆka)−y1+r
′
1(ˆkyw(−νb+a+yτ))y1/yw+c′2 = gˆr′1(D01)−ν(ˆky1)yτ (wˆφ1)c
′
2 ,
L3,i,1 = uˆr1i (wˆ
φ1)c3,i = (ˆkaAi+yui )−y1+r′1(ˆkyw(−νb+a+yτ))y1Ai/yw+c′3,i
= (ˆky1)−yui uˆr
′
1
i (D
0
1)
−νAi(ˆky1)yτ Ai(wˆφ1)c
′
3,i .
The semi-functional challenge ciphertext is correctly distributed as
C1,1 = gt = (ka)bx+t
′
= kabxgt ′ ,
C1,2 = (gν)t f sc = (kaν)bx+t ′k−a2x = (kabx)ν(gν)t ′(ka2x)−1,
C1,3 = (g−τ)t( f−φ2)sc = (ka(−a−yτ ))bx+t ′k−b(−a2x) = (kabx)−yτ (g−τ)t ′ ,
C2,1 = (h
n
∏
i=1
u
I∗γ,i
i )
t = (kaB+yh
n
∏
i=1
(kaAi+yui )I
∗
γ,i)bx+t
′
= (kabx)Γ(ID∗γ )(kbx)∆(ID∗γ )(h
n
∏
i=1
u
I∗γ,i
i )
t ′ ,
C2,2 = (hν
n
∏
i=1
(uνi )
I∗γ,i)t( f sc)zc = (k(aB+yh)ν
n
∏
i=1
(k(aAi+yui )ν)I
∗
γ,i)bx+t
′k−a2xΓ(ID∗γ )
= (kabx)Γ(ID∗γ )ν(kbx)∆(ID∗γ )ν(hν
n
∏
i=1
(uνi )
I∗γ,i)t
′
(ka2x)−Γ(ID∗γ ),
C2,3 = (h−τ
n
∏
i=1
(u−τi )
I∗γ,i)t( f−φ2)sczc
= (k(aB+yh)(−a−yτ)
n
∏
i=1
(k(aAi+yui )(−a−yτ ))I
∗
γ,i)bx+t
′k−b(−a2x)Γ(ID∗γ )
= (kabx)−Γ(ID∗γ )yτ (kabx)−∆(ID∗γ)(kbx)−∆(ID∗γ)yτ (h−τ
n
∏
i=1
(u−τi )
I∗γ,i)t
′
.
Note that it can create the semi-functional ciphertext with only fixed zc = Γ(ID∗γ) since sc,zc enable the
cancellation of ka2bx. Even though the simulator uses the fixed zc, the distribution of zc is correct since
B,{Ai} for zc are information theoretically hidden to A. We next show that the distribution of the simula-
tion using D,T1 = (D11,D12) = (ˆkby1+d1 , ˆkby2+d2) is the same as G′1,k except the k-th private key is nominally
semi-functional. We only consider the distribution of the k-th private key since T = (D1,D2) is only used
in the k-th private key. The only difference between T0 = (D01,D02) and T1 = (D11,D12) is that T1 = (D11,D12)
additionally has (ˆkd1 , ˆkd2). The decryption and delegation components K1,1,K1,2,K2,1,K2,2,{L3,i,1,L3,i,2}
that have D1 in the simulation additionally have (ˆkd1)−νΓ(ID),(ˆkd1)Γ(ID), (ˆkd1)−ν , ˆkd1 ,{(ˆkd1)−νAi,(ˆkd1)Ai} re-
spectively. The randomization components R1,1,R1,2,R2,1,R2,2,{R3,i,1,R3,i,2} that have D2 in the simulation
also have the additional values except that ˆkd2 is used instead of ˆkd1 . If we implicitly set sk,1 = d1,zk,1 =
Γ(ID),{zk,2,i = Ai}li=m+1,sk,2 = d2, then the distribution of the k-th private key is the same as G′1,k except
that the k-the private key is nominally semi-functional type-1.
Finally, we show that the adversary cannot distinguish the nominally semi-functional type-1 private key
from the semi-functional type-1 private key. The main idea of this proof is that the adversary cannot request
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a private key for ID that is a prefix of a challenge identity ID∗ in the security model. Suppose there exists
an unbounded adversary, then the adversary can gather the values zk,1 = Γ(ID) = B+∑mi=1 AiIi,{zk,2,i =
Ai}li=m+1 from the k-the private key query for ID = (I1, . . . , Im) and zc = Γ(ID∗γ) = B+∑ni=1 AiI∗γ ,i from the
challenge ciphertext for ID∗γ = (I∗γ ,1, . . . , I∗γ ,n). In case of n≥ m, the values that are revealed to the adversary
are described as


1 I∗γ ,1 · · · I∗γ ,m I∗γ ,m+1 · · · 0
1 I1 · · · Im 0 · · · 0
0 0 · · · 0 1 · · · 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
0 0 · · · 0 0 · · · 1




B
A1
.
.
.
Am
Am+1
.
.
.
Al


=


zc
zk,1
zk,2,m+1
.
.
.
zk,2,l


.
It is easy to show that the row rank of the above (l −m + 2)× (l + 1) matrix is l −m + 2 since there
exists an index j such that I j 6= I∗γ , j. It means that the above matrix is non-singular. In case of n < m, the
revealed values to the adversary also can be described as a similar matrix equation as the above one. The
row rank of this (l−m+2)× (l +1) matrix is l−m+2 since Im 6= 0. Therefore these values look random
to the unbounded adversary since the matrixes for two cases are non-singular and B,A1, . . . ,Al are chosen
randomly. We obtain Pr[B2(D,T0) = 0]−1/2 = Adv
G1,k−1
A
and Pr[B2(D,T1) = 0]−1/2 = Adv
G′1,k
A
from the
above analysis. Thus, we can easily derive the advantage of B2 as
AdvA2B2(λ ) =
∣∣Pr[B2(D,T0) = 0]−Pr[B2(D,T1) = 0]
∣∣= ∣∣AdvG1,k−1
A
−AdvG
′
1,k
A
∣∣.
This completes our proof.
5.3 Proof of Lemma 3.4 (Indistinguishability of G′1,k and G1,k)
In this proof, the challenge ciphertext is semi-functional and the k-th private key should be semi-functional
type-1 or semi-functional type-2 depending on the T value of the given assumption. The main idea of this
proof is to show that the semi-functional type-1 and semi-functional type-2 private keys are computationally
indistinguishable using the given assumption.
Before proving this lemma, we introduce Assumption 3-A as follows: Let (p,G, ˆG,GT ,e) be a de-
scription of the asymmetric bilinear group of prime order p. Let g, gˆ be generators of G, ˆG respectively.
Assumption 3-A is that if the challenge values D = ((p,G, ˆG,GT ,e),k, ˆk, ˆkx1 , ˆkx2,1 , . . . , ˆkx2,l , ˆky) and T =
(D1,D2,1, . . . ,D2,l) are given, no PPT algorithm can distinguish T = T0 = (ˆkx1y, ˆkx2,1y, . . . , ˆkx2,ly) from T =
T1 = (ˆkd1 , ˆkd2,1 , . . . , ˆkd2,l) with more than a negligible advantage. It is easy to show that if there exists an
adversary that breaks Assumption 3-A, then an algorithm can break Assumption 3 with the same probability
by setting ˆkx1 = (ˆka)r1 ˆks1 ,{ˆkx2,i = (ˆka)r2,i ˆks2,i}li=1, ˆky = ˆkb,D1 = (T )r1(ˆkb)s1 ,{D2,i = (T )r2,i(ˆkb)s2,i}li=1 where
ˆka, ˆkb,T are given in Assumption 3 and r1,s1,{r2,i,s2,i}li=1 are random exponents in Zp. The simulated val-
ues are correctly distributed since there exists one-to-one correspondence between {r1,s1,{r2,i},{s2,i}} and
{x1,{x2,i},d1,{d2,i}}.
Simulator. Suppose there exists an adversary A that distinguishes between G′1,k and G1,k with a non-
negligible advantage. A simulator B3 that breaks Assumption 3-A using A is given: a challenge tuple
D = ((p,G, ˆG,GT ,e),k, ˆk, ˆkx1 , ˆkx2,1 , . . . , ˆkx2,l , ˆky) and T = (D1, . . . ,D2,l) where T = T0 = (D01, . . . ,D02,l) =
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(ˆkx1y, ˆkx2,1y, . . . , ˆkx2,ly) or T = T1 = (D11, . . . ,D12,l) = (ˆkd1 , ˆkd2,1 , . . . , ˆkd2,l ). Then B3 that interacts with A is
described as follows: B3 first chooses random exponents ν ,φ1,φ2,α ∈ Zp and random blinding values
yg,yh,{yui}li=1,yw ∈ Zp. It implicitly sets τ = φ1 + νφ2 and sets g = kyg , gˆ = ˆkyg ,h = kyh , ˆh = ˆkyh ,{ui =
kyui , uˆi = ˆkyui}li=1, wˆ = ˆkyw . It creates the public parameters as
PP =
(
g,gν ,g−τ , h,hν ,h−τ , {ui,uνi ,u−τi }
l
i=1, wˆ
φ1, wˆφ2 , wˆ,Ω = e(g, gˆ)α
)
and the master key as MK = (gˆ, gˆα , ˆh,{uˆi}li=1). Additionally, it sets f = k, ˆf = ˆk for the semi-functional
ciphertext and private key. Let ∆(ID) = yh +∑mi=1 yui Ii where ID = (I1, . . . , Im). A adaptively requests a
private key for ID = (I1, . . . , Im). If this is a j-th private key query, then B3 handles this query as follows:
• Case j < k : It creates a semi-functional private key by calling KeyGenSF-2 since it knows the master
key and the tuple ( ˆf−ν , ˆf ,1) for the semi-functional private key.
• Case j = k : It first selects random exponents r1,c1,c2,{c3,i}li=m+1,sk,1 ∈ Zp. It implicitly sets zk,1 =
x1, {zk,2,i = x2,i}
l
i=m+1 and creates the decryption and delegation components of a private key as
K1,1 = gˆα(ˆh
m
∏
i=1
uˆ
Ii
i )
r1(wˆφ1)c1(ˆkx1)−νsk,1, K1,2 = (wˆφ2)c1(ˆkx1)sk,1 , K1,3 = wˆc1 ,
K2,1 = gˆr1(wˆφ1)c2 ˆk−νsk,1, K2,2 = (wˆφ2)c2 ˆksk,1 , K2,3 = wˆc2 ,{
L3,i,1 = uˆr1i (wˆ
φ1)c3,i(ˆkx2,i)−νsk,1, L3,i,2 = (wˆφ2)c3,i(ˆkx2,i)sk,1 , L3,i,3 = wˆc3,i
}l
i=m+1.
Next, it selects random exponents r2,c4,c5,{c6,i}li=m+1 ∈ Zp. It implicitly sets sk,2 = y and creates the
randomization components of a private key as
R1,1 = (ˆh
m
∏
i=1
uˆ
Ii
i )
r2(wˆφ1)c4(D1)−ν , R1,2 = (wˆφ2)c4 D1, R1,3 = wˆc4 ,
R2,1 = gˆr2(wˆφ1)c5(ˆky)−ν , R2,2 = (wˆφ2)c5 ˆky, R2,3 = wˆc5 ,{
R3,i,1 = uˆr2i (wˆ
φ1)c6,i(D2,i)−ν , R3,i,2 = (wˆφ2)c6,i D2,i, R3,i,3 = wˆc6,i
}l
i=m+1.
• Case j > k : It creates a normal private key by calling KeyGen since it knows the master key.
In the challenge step,A submits two challenge hierarchical identities ID∗0 =(I∗0,1, . . . , I∗0,n), ID∗1 =(I∗1,1, . . . , I∗1,n)
and two messages M∗0 ,M∗1 . B3 flips a random coin γ ∈ {0,1} internally. It creates a semi-functional chal-
lenge ciphertext by calling EncryptSF on the message Mγ and the hierarchical identity ID∗γ since it knows
the tuple (1, f , f−φ2) for the semi-functional ciphertext. Finally, A outputs a guess γ ′. If γ = γ ′, B3 outputs
0. Otherwise, it outputs 1.
Analysis. We first show that the distribution of the simulation using D,T0 = (D01, . . . ,D02,l) is the same
as G′1,k. It is easy to check that the private key components are correctly distributed except the randomiza-
tion components of the k-th private key. If we implicitly set zk,1 = x1,{zk,2,i = x2,i}li=m+1,sk,2 = y, then the
randomization components of the k-th private key have the same distribution as G′1,k. We next show that the
distribution of the simulation using D,T1 = (D11, . . . ,D12,l) is the same as G1,k. We only consider the distri-
bution of the randomization components of the k-th private key since T is only used in the randomization
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components of the k-th private key. If we implicitly set sk,2 = y, zk,3 = d1/y, {zk,4,i = d2,i/y}li=m+1, then the
randomization components are correctly distributed as
R1,1 = (ˆh
m
∏
i=1
uˆIii )
r2(wˆφ1)c4( ˆf−ν)sk,2zk,3 = (ˆh
m
∏
i=1
uˆIii )
r2(wˆφ1)c4(ˆk−ν)y·d1/y = (ˆh
m
∏
i=1
uˆIii )
r2(wˆφ1)c4(D11)−ν ,
R3,i,1 = uˆr2i (wˆ
φ1)c6,i( ˆf−ν)sk,2zk,4,i = uˆr2i (wˆφ1)c6,i(ˆk−ν)y·d2,i/y = uˆr2i (wˆφ1)c6,i(D12,i)−ν .
From the above analysis, we can obtain Pr[B3(D,T0) = 0]− 1/2 = Adv
G′1,k
A
and Pr[B3(D,T1) = 0]− 1/2 =
AdvG1,k
A
. Thus, we can easily derive the advantage of B3 as
AdvA3B3(λ ) =
∣∣Pr[B3(D,T0) = 0]−Pr[B3(D,T1) = 0]
∣∣= ∣∣AdvG
′
1,k
A
−AdvG1,k
A
∣∣.
This completes our proof.
5.4 Proof of Lemma 3.5 (Indistinguishability of G2 and G3)
In this proof, private keys and the challenge ciphertext are semi-functional type-2 and semi-functional re-
spectively, but a session key should be correct or random depending on the T value of the given assumption.
The main idea of this proof is to enforce a simulator to solve the Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) prob-
lem in order to create the normal types of private keys and ciphertexts. However, the simulator can generate
the semi-functional types of private keys and ciphertexts since an additional random value in semi-functional
types enables the cancellation of the CDH value.
Simulator. Suppose there exists an adversary A that distinguishes between G2 and G3 with a non-
negligible advantage. A simulator B4 that breaks Assumption 4 using A is given: a challenge tuple D =
((p,G, ˆG,GT ,e),k,ka,kb,kc, ˆk, ˆka, ˆkb, ˆkc) and T where T = T0 = e(k, ˆk)abc or T = T1 = e(k, ˆk)d . Then B4 that
interacts withA is described as follows: B4 first chooses random exponents φ1,φ2 ∈Zp and random blinding
values yg,yh,{yui}li=1,yw ∈Zp. It sets g = kyg ,h = kyh ,{ui = kyui}li=1, gˆ = ˆkyg , ˆh = ˆkyh ,{uˆi = ˆkyui}li=1, wˆ = ˆkyw .
It implicitly sets ν = a,τ = φ1 +aφ2,α = ab and creates the public parameters as
g, gν = (ka)yg , g−τ = k−ygφ1(ka)−ygφ2 , h, hν = (ka)yh , h−τ = k−yhφ1(ka)−yhφ2 ,
{
ui, u
ν
i = (ka)yui , u−τi = k−yui φ1(ka)−yui φ2
}l
i=1, wˆ
φ1 , wˆφ2 , wˆ, Ω = e(ka, ˆkb)y2g .
Additionally, it sets f = k, ˆf = ˆk for the semi-functional ciphertext and private key. Let ∆(ID) = yh +
∑mi=1 yui Ii where ID = (I1, . . . , Im). A adaptively requests a private key for ID = (I1, . . . , Im). To response
the private key query, B4 first selects random exponents r1,c1,c2,{c3,i}li=m+1,sk,1,z′k,1,{zk,2,i}li=m+1 ∈ Zp.
It implicitly sets zk,1 = byg/sk,1 + z′k,1 and creates the decryption and delegation components of a semi-
functional private key as
K1,1 = (ˆh
m
∏
i=1
uˆIii )
r1(wˆφ1)c1(ˆka)−sk,1z
′
k,1 , K1,2 = (wˆφ2)c1(ˆkb)yg ˆksk,1z
′
k,1 , K1,3 = wˆc1 ,
K2,1 = gˆr1(wˆφ1)c2(ˆka)−sk,1 , K2,2 = (wˆφ2)c2 ˆksk,1 , K2,3 = wˆc2 ,{
L3,i,1 = uˆr1i (wˆ
φ1)c3,i(ˆka)−sk,1zk,2,i , L3,i,2 = (wˆφ2)c3,i ˆksk,1zk,2,i, L3,i,3 = wˆc3,i
}l
i=m+1.
Next, it selects random exponents r2,c4,c5,{c6,i}li=m+1,sk,2,zk,3,{zk,4,i}li=m+1 ∈ Zp and creates the random-
ization components of a semi-functional private key. In the challenge step, A submits two challenge hierar-
chical identities ID∗0 = (I∗0,1, . . . , I∗0,n), ID∗1 = (I∗1,1, . . . , I∗1,n) and two messages M∗0 ,M∗1 . B4 flips a random coin
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γ ∈ {0,1} internally and chooses random exponents s′c,z′c ∈Zp. It implicitly sets t = c, sc =−acyg+s′c, zc =
−ac∆(ID∗γ)/sc + z′c/sc and creates the semi-functional ciphertext as
C = (T )y2g ·M∗γ , C1,1 = (kc)yg , C1,2 = ks
′
c , C1,3 = (kc)−ygφ1k−φ2s
′
c ,
C2,1 = (kc)∆(ID
∗
γ ), C2,2 = kz
′
c , C2,3 = (kc)−∆(ID
∗
γ )φ1k−φ2z′c .
Finally, A outputs a guess γ ′. If γ = γ ′, B4 outputs 0. Otherwise, it outputs 1.
Analysis. We first show that the distribution of the simulation using D,T0 = e(k, ˆk)abc is the same as G2.
The public parameters are correctly distributed since the random blinding values yg,yh,{yui},yw are used.
The semi-functional private key is correctly distributed as
K1,1 = gˆα(ˆh
m
∏
i=1
uˆIii )
r1(wˆφ1)c1( ˆf−ν)sk,1zk,1 = ˆkygab(ˆh
m
∏
i=1
uˆIii )
r1(wˆφ1)c1(ˆk−a)sk,1·(byg/sk,1+z
′
k,1)
= (ˆh
m
∏
i=1
uˆ
Ii
i )
r1(wˆφ1)c1(ˆka)−sk,1z
′
k,1 .
Note that it can only create a semi-functional private key since zk,1 = byg/sk,1 + z′k,1 enables the cancellation
of ˆkab. The semi-functional challenge ciphertext is correctly distributed as
C = e(g, gˆ)αtM∗γ = e(kyg , ˆkyg)abcM∗γ = (T )y
2
g M∗γ ,
C1,1 = gt = (kyg)c = (kc)yg ,
C1,2 = (gν)t f sc = (kyga)ck−acyg+s′c = ks′c ,
C1,3 = (g−τ)t( f−φ2)sc = (k−yg(φ1+aφ2))ck−φ2(−acyg+s′c) = (kc)−ygφ1k−φ2s′c ,
C2,1 = (h
n
∏
i=1
u
I∗γ,i
i )
t = (kyh
n
∏
i=1
kyui I∗γ,i)c = (kc)∆(ID∗γ ),
C2,2 = (hν
n
∏
i=1
(uνi )
I∗γ,i)t f sczc = (kyha
n
∏
i=1
kyui aI
∗
γ,i)cksc(−ac∆(ID∗γ )/sc+z′c/sc) = kz′c ,
C2,3 = (h−τ
n
∏
i=1
(u−τi )
I∗γ,i)t( f−φ2)sczc
= (k−yh(φ1+aφ2)
n
∏
i=1
k−yui (φ1+aφ2)I
∗
γ,i)c(k−φ2)sc(−ac∆(ID∗γ )/sc+z′c/sc) = (kc)−∆(ID∗γ )φ1k−φ2z′c .
Note that it can create a semi-functional ciphertext since sc,zc enable the cancellation of kac. We next show
that the distribution of the simulation using D,T1 = e(k, ˆk)d is the same as G3. It is obvious that C is a
random element since T1 = e(k, ˆk)d . From the above analysis, we obtain Pr[B4(D,T0) = 0]−1/2 = AdvG2A
and Pr[B4(D,T1) = 0]−1/2 = AdvG3A . Thus, we can easily derive the advantage of B4 as
AdvA4B4(λ ) =
∣∣Pr[B4(D,T0) = 0]−Pr[B4(D,T1) = 0]
∣∣= ∣∣AdvG2
A
−AdvG3
A
∣∣.
This completes our proof.
5.5 Proof of Lemma 3.6 (Indistinguishability of G3 and G4)
In this proof, private keys and the challenge ciphertext are semi-functional type-2 and semi-functional re-
spectively, and the elements of the challenge ciphertext should be well-formed or random depending on
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the T value of the given assumption. The idea to generate semi-functional type-2 private keys and semi-
functional ciphertexts is similar to Lemma 3.5, but it uses a different assumption. To prove anonymity,
the simulator embeds the T value of the assumption into the all elements of the challenge ciphertext that
contains an identity.
Simulator. Suppose there exists an adversary A that distinguishes between G3 and G4 with a non-
negligible advantage. A simulator B5 that breaks Assumption 5 using A is given: a challenge tuple D =
((p,G, ˆG,GT ,e),k,ka,kb,kc,kab,ka
2b, ˆk, ˆka, ˆkb) and T where T = T0 = kabc or T = T1 = kd . Then B5 that
interacts with A is described as follows: B5 first chooses random exponents φ1,φ2,α ∈ Zp and random
blinding values yg,yh,{yui}li=1,yw ∈ Zp. It sets g = kyg ,h = (kab)yh ,{ui = (kab)yui}li=1, gˆ = ˆkyg , wˆ = ˆkyw , gˆα =
ˆkygα . It implicitly sets ν = a,τ = φ1 +aφ2 and publishes the public parameters as
g, gν = (ka)yg , g−τ = k−ygφ1(ka)−ygφ2 , h, hν = (ka2b)yh , h−τ = (kab)−yhφ1(ka2b)−yhφ2 ,
{
ui,u
ν
i = (ka
2b)yui ,u−τi = (kab)−yui φ1(ka
2b)−yui φ2
}l
i=1, wˆ
φ1, wˆφ2 , wˆ, Ω = e(k, ˆk)y2gα .
It also implicitly sets ˆh= (ˆkab)yh ,{uˆi = (ˆkab)yui} for the master key, but it cannot create these values since ˆkab
is not given. Additionally, it sets f = k, ˆf = ˆk for the semi-functional ciphertext and private key. Let ∆(ID)=
yh+∑mi=1 yui Ii where ID = (I1, . . . , Im). A adaptively requests a private key for ID = (I1, . . . , Im). To response
the private key query, B5 first selects random exponents r1,c1,c2,{c3,i}li=m+1,sk,1,z′k,1,{z′k,2,i}li=m+1 ∈ Zp. It
implicitly sets zk,1 = b∆(ID)r1/sk,1 + z′k,1, {zk,2,i = byui r1/sk,1 + z′k,2,i}li=m+1 and creates the decryption and
delegation components of a semi-functional private key as
K1,1 = gˆα(wˆφ1)c1(ˆka)−sk,1z
′
k,1, K1,2 = (wˆφ2)c1(ˆkb)∆(ID)r1 ˆksk,1z
′
k,1, K1,3 = wˆc1 ,
K2,1 = gˆr1(wˆφ1)c2(ˆka)−sk,1, K2,2 = (wˆφ2)c2 ˆksk,1 , K2,3 = wˆc2 ,{
L3,i,1 = (wˆφ1)c3,i(ˆka)−sk,1z
′
k,2,i , L3,i,2 = (wˆφ2)c3,i(ˆkb)yui r1 ˆksk,1z
′
k,2,i , L3,i,3 = wˆc3,i
}l
i=m+1.
Next, it selects random exponents r2,c4,c5,{c6,i}li=m+1,sk,2,z′k,3,{z′k,4,i}li=m+1 ∈ Zp and creates the random-
ization components of a semi-functional private key by implicitly setting zk,3 = b∆(ID)r2/sk,2+z′k,3, {zk,4,i =
byui r2/sk,2 + z′k,4,i}li=m+1. We omit the detailed description of these, since these are similar to the decryp-
tion and delegation components except that R1,1 does not have gˆα . In the challenge step, A submits two
challenge hierarchical identities ID∗0 = (I∗0,1, . . . , I∗0,n), ID∗1 = (I∗1,1, . . . , I∗1,n) and two messages M∗0 ,M∗1 . B5
flips a random coin γ ∈ {0,1} internally and chooses random exponents δ ,s′c,z′c ∈ Zp. It implicitly sets
t = c, sc =−acyg + s′c, zc =−a2bc∆(ID∗γ )/sc +abcz′c/sc and creates the semi-functional ciphertext as
C = Ωδ ·M∗γ , C1,1 = (kc)yg , C1,2 = (ka)s
′
c , C1,3 = (kc)−ygφ1k−φ2s
′
c ,
C2,1 = (T )∆(ID
∗
γ ), C2,2 = (T )z
′
c , C2,3 = (T )−∆(ID
∗
γ )φ1(T )−z
′
cφ2 .
Finally, A outputs a guess γ ′. If γ = γ ′, B5 outputs 0. Otherwise, it outputs 1.
Analysis. We first show that the distribution of the simulation using D,T0 = kabc is the same as G3. The
public parameters are correctly distributed since the random blinding values are used. The semi-functional
private key is correctly distributed as
K1,1 = gˆα(ˆh
m
∏
i=1
uˆ
Ii
i )
r1(wˆφ1)c1( ˆf−ν)sk,1zk,1 = gˆα(ˆkab)∆(ID)r1(wˆφ1)c1(ˆk−a)sk,1(b∆(ID)r1/sk,1+z′k,1)
= gˆα(wˆφ1)c1(ˆka)−sk,1z
′
k,1,
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K2,1 = gˆr1(wˆφ1)c2( ˆf−ν)sk,1 = gˆr1(wˆφ1)c2(ˆka)−sk,1 ,
L3,i,1 = uˆr1i (wˆ
φ1)c3,i( ˆf−ν)sk,1zk,2,i = (ˆkab)yui r1(wˆφ1)c3,i(ˆka)−sk,1·(byui r1/sk,1+z′k,2,i)
= (wˆφ1)c3,i(ˆka)−sk,1z
′
k,2,i .
Note that it can only create a semi-functional type-2 private key since zk,1,{zk,2,i},zk,3,{zk,4,i} enable the
cancellation of ˆkab. The semi-functional challenge ciphertext is correctly distributed as
C1,1 = gt = (kyg)c = (kc)yg ,
C1,2 = (gν)t f sc = (kyga)ck−acyg+s′c = ks′c ,
C1,3 = (g−τ)t( f−φ2)sc = (k−yg(φ1+aφ2))ck−φ2(−acyg+s′c) = (kc)−ygφ1k−φ2s′c ,
C2,1 = (h
n
∏
i=1
u
I∗γ,i
i )
t = (kab)∆(ID∗γ )c = (T0)∆(ID
∗
γ ),
C2,2 = (h
n
∏
i=1
u
I∗γ,i
i )
νt f sczc = ((kab)∆(ID∗γ ))acksc(−a2bc∆(ID∗γ )/sc+abcz′c/sc) = (T0)z′c ,
C2,3 = (h
n
∏
i=1
u
I∗γ,i
i )
−τt( f−φ2)sczc = ((kab)∆(ID∗γ ))−(φ1+aφ2)ck−φ2sc(−a2bc∆(ID∗γ )/sc+abcz′c/sc)
= (T0)−∆(ID
∗
γ)φ1(T0)−z
′
cφ2 .
Note that it can only create a semi-functional ciphertext since sc,zc enable the cancellation of ka
2bc
. We
next show that the distribution of the simulation using D,T1 = kd is the same as G4. We only consider
C2,1,C2,2,C2,3 components of the semi-functional challenge ciphertext since T is used for these components.
If we implicitly sets P = k∆(ID∗γ )d/c and zc = −ad∆(ID∗γ)/sc + dz′c/sc, then the semi-functional challenge
ciphertext is correctly distributed as
C2,1 = Pc = (k∆(ID
∗
γ )d/c)c = (T1)∆(ID
∗
γ ),
C2,2 = Pνc f sczc = (k∆(ID∗γ )d/c)acksc(−ad∆(ID∗γ )/sc+dz′c/sc) = (T1)z′c ,
C2,3 = P−τc( f−φ2)sczc = (k∆(ID∗γ )d/c)−(φ1+aφ2)ck−φ2sc(−ad∆(ID∗γ )/sc+dz′c/sc)
= (T1)−∆(ID
∗
γ )φ1(T1)−z
′
cφ2.
From the above analysis, we obtain Pr[B5(D,T0) = 0]−1/2 = AdvG3A and Pr[B5(D,T1) = 0]−1/2 = Adv
G4
A
.
Thus, we can easily derive the advantage of B5 as
AdvA5B5(λ ) =
∣∣Pr[B5(D,T0) = 0]−Pr[B5(D,T1) = 0]
∣∣= ∣∣AdvG3
A
−AdvG4
A
∣∣.
This completes our proof.
6 Generic Group Model
In this section, we prove that the new assumption of this paper is secure under the generic group model. The
generic group model was introduced by Shoup [43], and it is a tool for analyzing generic algorithms that
work independently of the group representation. In the generic group model, an adversary is given a random
encoding of a group element or an arbitrary index of a group element instead of the actual representation
of a group element. Thus, the adversary performs group operations through oracles that are provided by a
simulator, and the adversary only can check the equality of group elements. The detailed explanation of the
generic group model is given in [7, 28].
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6.1 Master Theorem
To analyze the new assumption of this paper, we slightly modify the master theorem of Katz et al. [28]
since the new assumption is defined over asymmetric bilinear groups of prime order. Let G, ˆG,GT be
asymmetric bilinear groups of prime order p. The bilinear map is defined as e : G× ˆG→GT . In the generic
group model, a random group element of G, ˆG,GT is represented as a random variable Pi,Qi,Ri respectively
where Pi,Qi,Ri are chosen uniformly in Zp. We say that a random variable has degree t if the maximum
degree of any variable is t. The generalized definition of dependence and independence is given as follows:
Definition 6.1. Let P= {P1, . . . ,Pu}, T0,T1 be random variables over G where T0 6= T1, let Q= {Q1, . . . ,Qw}
be random variables over ˆG, and let R = {R1, . . . ,Rv} be random variables over GT . Let l = max{u,w,v}.
We say that Tb is dependent on P if there exists constants α ,{βi} such that
α ·Tb =
u
∑
i=1
βi ·Pi
where α 6= 0. We say that Tb is independent of P if Tb is not dependent on P. We say that {e(Tb,Qi)}i is
dependent on P∪Q∪R if there exist constants {αi},{βi, j},{γi} such that
w
∑
i=1
αi · e(Tb,Qi) =
u
∑
i=1
w
∑
j=1
βi, j · e(Pi,Q j)+
v
∑
i=1
γi ·Ri
where αi 6= 0 for at least one i. We say that {e(Tb,Qi)}i is independent of P∪Q∪R if {e(Tb,Qi)}i is not
dependent on P∪Q∪R.
We can obtain the following theorem by using the above dependence and independence of random
variables.
Theorem 6.2. Let P = {P1, . . . ,Pu}, T0,T1 be random variables over G where T0 6= T1, let Q = {Q1, . . . ,Qw}
be random variables over ˆG, and let R = {R1, . . . ,Rv} be random variables over GT . Let l = max{u,w,v}.
Consider the following experiment in the generic group model:
An algorithm is given P = {P1, . . . ,Pu}, Q = {Q1, . . . ,Qw}, and R = {R1, . . . ,Rv}. A random
bit b is chosen, and the adversary is given Tb. The algorithm outputs a bit b′, and succeeds if
b′ = b. The algorithm’s advantage is the absolute value of the difference between its success
probability and 1/2.
If Tb is independent of P for all b ∈ {0,1}, and {e(Tb,Q j)} j is independent of P∪Q∪R for all b ∈ {0,1},
then any algorithm A issuing at most q instructions has an advantage at most 3(q+2l)2t/p.
Proof. The proof consists of a sequence of games. The first game will be the original experiment that is
described in the theorem and the last game will be a game that the algorithm has no advantage. We define
the games as follows:
Game G1. This game is the original game. In this game, the simulator instantiates each of random variables
P,Q,R,Tb by choosing random values for each of the formal variables. Then it gives the handles of
P,Q,R,Tb to the algorithm A. Next, A requests a sequence of multiplication, exponentiation, and
pairing instructions, and is given the handles of results. Finally, A outputs a bit b′.
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Game G2. We slightly modify G1 into a new game G2. In this game, the simulator never concretely in-
stantiates the formal variables. Instead it keeps the formal polynomials themselves. Additionally, the
simulator gives identical handles for two elements only if these elements are equal as formal polyno-
mials in each of their components. That is, the simulator of this game assigns different handles for X
and Y since these are different polynomials. Note that the simulator of G1 assigned the same handle
for X = (X1, . . . ,Xn) and Y = (Y1, . . . ,Yn) if Xi = Yi for all i.
To prove the theorem, we will show that the statistical distance between two games G1 and G2 is negli-
gible and the advantage of the algorithm in G2 is zero. Then the advantage of the algorithm in the original
game is bounded by the statistical distance between two games.
We first show that the statistical distance between two games G1 and G2 is negligible. The only differ-
ence between two games is the case that two different formal polynomials take the same value by concrete
instantiation. The probability of this event is at most t/p from the Schwartz-Zippel Lemma [40]. If we
consider all pairs of elements produced by the algorithm A, the statistical distance between two games is at
most 3(q+2l)2t/p since A can request at most q instructions, the maximum size of handles in each group
is at most q+2l, and there are three different groups.
We next show that the advantage of the algorithm in G2 is zero. In this game, the algorithm A only
can distinguish whether it is given T0 or T1 if it can generate a formal polynomial that is symbolically
equivalent to some previously generated polynomial for one value of b but not the other. In this case, we have
α ·Tb = ∑ui=1 βi ·Pi where α 6= 0, or else we have ∑wi=1 αi · e(Tb,Qi) = ∑ui=1 ∑wj=1 βi, j · e(Pi,Q j)+∑vi=1 γi ·Ri
where αi 6= 0 for at least one i (otherwise, symbolic equality would hold for both value of b). However, the
above equations are contradict to the independence assumptions of the theorem. Therefore, the advantage
of A in this game is zero.
6.2 Analysis of Asymmetric 3-Party Diffie-Hellman
To apply the master theorem of the previous section, we only need to show the independence of T0,T1 random
variables. Using the notation of previous section, Assumption 5 (Asymmetric 3-Party Diffie-Hellman) can
be written as
P = {1,A,B,C,AB,A2B}, Q = {1,A,B}, R = {1}, T0 = ABC, T1 = D.
At first, we show the independence of T1. It is trivial that T1 is independent of P since a random variable
D does not exist in P. It is easy to show that {e(T1,Qi)}i is independent of P∪Q∪R since T1 contains a
random variable D that does not exist in P,Q,R. Next, we show the independence of T0. It is easy to show
that T0 is independent of P since the random variables with degree 3 are different. To show the independence
of {e(T0,Qi)}i, we can derive the sets of random variables as
{e(T0,Q j)} j = {ABC,A2BC,AB2C},
{e(Pi,Q j)}i, j = {1,A,B,C,AB,A2B,A2,AC,A3B,B2,BC,AB2,A2B2},
{Ri}= {1}.
The random variables of {e(T0,Qi)}i always contain C and the degree of these random variables is greater
than 3. However, the random variables of {e(Pi,Q j)}i, j that contain C have the degree at most 2. Thus
{e(T0,Qi)}i is independent of P∪Q∪R.
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7 Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed an efficient anonymous HIBE scheme with short ciphertexts and proved its full
model security under static assumptions. Though our construction is based on the IBE scheme of Lewko and
Waters [33], it was not trivial to construct an anonymous HIBE scheme, since the randomization components
of private keys cause a problem in the security proof of dual system encryption. We leave it as an interesting
problem to construct a fully secure and anonymous HIBE scheme with short ciphertexts under standard
assumptions.
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